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Between Global and Local: 
Urban Inter-referencing and the 
Transformation of a Sino-South 
African Megaproject
R I C A R D O  R E B O R E D O  A N D  F R A N C E S  B R I L L
ABSTRACT: In 2012, a Chinese developer, Zendai, purchased 1,600 hectares of land in Modderfontein, Johannesburg, and announced plans 
for a new urban megadevelopment. Hiring a Chinese designer, the company released a series of computer-generated images. Drawing on 
these, the media and many in the city perceived the site to be distinctly “Chinese,” rooted in futuristic, speculative visions of urbanity. At 
the same time, African urban research turned its attention to similar large-scale projects throughout the continent, and has continued 
to speculate on their consequences. Building on these two different interpretations of Modderfontein, this paper engages with the site 
as a manifestation of both global trends (e.g., increasing Chinese engagement with Africa, urban inter-referencing throughout the Global 
South) and a reflection of place- and context-specific factors. In doing so, we focus on the ordinariness of the project to interrogate how 
the idea of creating an ultramodern global economic hub, rooted in the experiences and practices of a Chinese-based developer, was in 
the end mediated by the actions of international consultants and the City of Johannesburg. We suggest that Modderfontein should be 
seen as a generative form of urbanism where elements perceived to be Chinese were lost in the master planning process. We argue that 
the socio-material dimensions of the project instead reflect a distinctly South African urbanism.
KEYWORDS: Johannesburg, real estate, megaproject, comparative urbanism, China/Africa.
Introduction 
China’s growing influence on the African continent manifests in a multitude of ways. Among the most significant is the nexus between Chinese capital, technology, and expertise and Africa’s urban 
centres. For a continent such as Africa, with a history of extraversion and 
impeded development, cities can provide the necessary impetus for broad-
based growth as they are home to large, differentiated labour markets and 
allow for economies of scale in service and goods provision (Carmody and 
Owusu 2016). Similarly, cities act as central facilitators of globalisation and 
attract investment and industrial development (Castells 2010). Yet, while 
urbanisation can bring forth opportunity, it also presents challenges. Africa 
is home to a rapidly urbanising population that is expected to reach 1.3 
billion by 2050. As such, the continent faces a significant shortfall in urban 
infrastructure, housing, and services. Given these conditions, Chinese actors 
ranging from policy banks to state/private firms and individual investors 
have found significant commercial opportunities in the financing, design, and 
construction of African cities. Moreover, growing Chinese influence has also 
found expression in the circulation and transfer of ideas regarding economic 
development and the role of urban spaces in inducing growth (Murphy et al . 
2018). 
Within this context, this paper turns to the Chinese impact on African 
“new cities” – megaproject-sized, greenfield, master-planned developments 
that have become popular throughout the continent (Watson 2014; Van 
Noorloos and Kloosterboer 2018). Examples of these range from existing 
developments such as Kilamba Kiaxi in Angola and Eko-Atlantic in Nigeria 
to proposed projects such as New Cairo in Egypt, the Nairobi “Friendship 
City” in Kenya, and an as-of-yet unnamed $20 billion “industrial city” 
project in the Central region of Ghana. While heterogenous in objectives 
and designation (for instance, “Friendship City” and the Ghanaian industrial 
city will double as special economic zones [SEZ]), these projects share an 
exclusionary spatiality, and the aesthetic/plans of Chinese cities and broader 
urban spaces (Murphy et al . 2018). Indeed, a number of them are (or are 
scheduled to be) built or designed by Chinese companies. 
This paper thus seeks to question how the export of “Chinese” urban 
practices and urbanism translates into African built environments. It does 
this via a case study of the now defunct Modderfontein New City project 
in Johannesburg. Specifically, we question how Modderfontein, as a site 
owned and led by a Chinese developer, was originally envisioned as a space 
of “Chinese” urbanism in the heart of Johannesburg. Building on that and 
existing analysis of Modderfontein’s use of London-based expertise and 
inspiration (see Ballard and Harrison 2019; Brill and Conte 2019), we then 
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question how the local state (in the form of the City of Johannesburg) 
and the use of international consultants mediated and, in some ways, 
transformed this vision. This, we argue, in line with the theme of this special 
issue, reasserts the “ordinariness” of the project. 
Launched in 2013 by Shanghai-based real estate developer Zendai, the 
Modderfontein project was to be a 1,600 hectare mixed-use development in 
Johannesburg. Designed to mirror Chinese “new towns” (see below) in terms 
of linkages to both the wider city and the global economy, Zendai’s original 
concept projected Modderfontein as a hub for burgeoning Chinese (and 
more broadly, Asian) businesses during their anticipated African expansion. 
The Modderfontein development has garnered attention in academia as an 
example of a privatised edge city (Van Noorloos and Leung 2018; Brill and 
Reboredo 2018), and as an example of international real estate practices, 
specifically the role of non-local consultants and their use of London-based 
comparisons (Brill 2018; Ballard and Harrison 2019; Brill and Conte 2019). 
However, whilst internationalisation strategies have been addressed in 
terms of the English, American, and “global” imaginaries and expertise, there 
has been substantially less attention paid to the Chinese dimension of the 
project. A notable exception is Dittgen’s (2017) exploration of modernity 
and Chinese urbanism in Johannesburg, which is explicitly attendant to 
the Modderfontein project. In it he demonstrates the site’s transition from 
a “flashy investment project” to a “splintering of ownerships, company 
shares and (probably) business orientations.” In focusing on the corporate 
changes around Zendai, Dittgen revealed how, in contrast to other forms of 
Chinese urbanism in Johannesburg (specifically the city’s Chinese-owned 
malls and Chinatown neighbourhoods), Modderfontein’s “intended goals are 
consciously to contribute to the shaping of the future city.” We seek to build 
on this understanding and explore the transformation of Modderfontein 
while questioning the role of the Chinese developer in this context.
This research is based on more than 50 interviews conducted during 
the researchers’ doctoral dissertation fieldwork. Interviewees ranged from 
Heartland and Zendai employees to City Planners and other government 
officials, and were designed to create a broad yet deep understanding of the 
project throughout its evolution. Fieldwork was conducted intermittently 
by the two researchers over a span of approximately three years, between 
May 2015 and April 2018. This in-depth understanding is combined with 
documentary analysis of media reports, since it was through the (mostly 
South African) media that a particular version of Chinese urbanism was 
produced. Additionally, we consider the master plan (and interim updates) 
circulated by Zendai and their consultants. This paper focuses on the early 
stages of the planning process, specifically the period from 2012 to 2015, 
since it was during these first few years of (attempted) development that 
Zendai’s vision was most prominently articulated. Moreover, the majority of 
existing analysis of Modderfontein has tended to look at the later periods. 
The vision created at the time of our focus informed later understandings, on 
the part of both project consultants and the City of Johannesburg, of what 
the Chinese developer ultimately wanted. 
The paper proceeds in the following way: the second section introduces 
the concept of urban inter-referencing and discusses how it plays out 
throughout the Global South. The third section then explains the historico-
geographic configurations behind the elements of “Chinese” urbanism 
currently being exported to Africa. The fourth section looks at the early 
stages of the pre-planning application, those that immediately followed 
Zendai’s acquisition of the site, to understand how media releases produced, 
articulated, and reinforced a particular version of “Chinese urbanism” in this 
context. In section five, the mediation of these images through the planning 
application process and master-planning exercise is used to demonstrate 
how the site was transformed from a “Chinese” development into something 
distinctly South African. The final section then analyses local reactions to 
the project, demonstrating how the initial concepts and images remained 
ingrained in the public imagination despite the broad changes taking place 
throughout the planning process. 
Urban inter-referencing in the Global South 
 
“Masterplanning has, almost everywhere, carried with it a particular 
vision of the ‘good city’” (Watson 2009: 2261). In this respect, plans are 
underpinned by processes of inter-referencing and utopian ideals focused on 
well-recognised models. Such designs are based on a desire to be recognised 
internationally and to play a part in the global economy, thus despite a 
broad understanding of the flaws of having one overarching scheme or 
redevelopment, master plans or pre-defined “visions” continue to dominate 
in some locations (Roy and Ong 2011), especially in the Global South (see for 
example Ansari (2004) on Indian cities’ use of master plans). Often emerging 
from the use of grand, pre-determined master-planning approaches to 
development are tensions between “global” and “local” forces. In particular, 
when new places manifest as a city, often as “new cities,” enclaves, or “edge 
cities,” in a way that makes a “clear attempt to link (…) physical visions to 
contemporary rhetoric on urban sustainability” (Watson 2014: 3), the legal 
position of existing city-wide plans can be undermined. In an African context, 
Watson highlights how grand master plans for new development plans 
have problems from the start, suggesting a policy mismatch at the point 
where “global economic forces are interacting with local African contexts 
in new ways” (ibid.: 8). This echoes other research showing “actual existing 
urbanisms” pitched against the forces of globalisation and worlding (Shatkin 
2011).
Rather than necessarily confronting these challenges, the focus of plans 
for new areas ends up being on the “global circuits of property construction” 
and the fantasy and dream-like nature of plans (ibid.; Rapoport 2014), 
rather than actually existing urban realities. In particular, with the increasing 
popularity of “South-South” urban imaginaries and inter-referencing, more 
African cities are looking towards Asia in search of both urban concepts 
and capital investment (Van Noorloos and Leung 2018; Adama, 2017). 
As Ong (2011) notes, Asian cities have become the models of an urban 
future that “does not find its ultimate reference in the west.” Indeed, as 
cities throughout the continent seek to improve their position within the 
global urban hierarchy, megapolises such as Shanghai, Singapore, and Dubai 
are often cited as inspiration by both elites and planners. Pressing the 
issue are two factors: Africa’s rapid, large-scale urbanisation, which often 
occurs informally, overloading city services and exacerbating extant socio-
economic problems; and the continent’s dependence on primary resource 
export, which allows for elite rent capture but does not create broad-based 
sustainable development or employment opportunities (Taylor 2016; Adama 
2017). 
It is within this context that localities turn to megaprojects, mega-
developments, and “new towns” as a possible panacea. These types of 
projects are among “the most visible urban revitalisation strategies” 
undertaken by aspiring city elites and have emerged as popular schemes to 
both solve existing urban problems and attract global capital (Swyngedouw 
et al . 2002). In the South African context, large-scale investments have 
become a central point of housing delivery on a national scale (Ballard and 
Rubin 2017), yet the way in which they have manifested is contested and 
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dependent on the interaction between different levels of government and 
the private sector – there is a plurality of forms (Ballard et al . 2017).
In the case of Modderfontein, the media and many in the City perceived 
the site to be a distinctly “Chinese” form of urbanism, rooted in futuristic, 
speculative visions of urbanity. Yet as Ren and Weinstein (2009) note, 
despite the preponderance of elites attempting to “Shanghai” (used here 
as a verb) their city, few understand the multitude of historically specific 
processes and transformations that created contemporary Shanghai itself. 
Indeed, the question of what is (or whether there is) a specific “Chinese 
urban imaginary” requires an understanding of the historico-geographical 
development of Chinese cities, as the concept of “Chinese urbanism” and 
the production of the country’s urban landscapes is embedded within 
temporally specific configurations that overlap and transcend geographical 
and regulatory scales (Cartier 2002; Wu 2016; Shen and Wu 2017). The 
specific articulations of this urban form (e.g. new cities, special economic 
zones) and the particular livelihoods they are intertwined with thus cannot 
be overlaid into separate contexts without fundamental alterations. 
Chinese urbanism and the popularisation of new 
city/new town developments 
The “Chinese” vision of the urban, beginning with the early urbanism of 
the Shang Dynasty, has largely conceptualised the city as intertwined with 
the state’s practices, ideologies, and exercise of social control (Lin 2007). 
This remains the case today, as China’s urban transformation has been both 
driven and managed by the state through its planning and regulatory bodies 
in order to promote growth (and thus ensure stability) without the direct 
commands available in a centrally planned economy (Shen and Wu 2017). 
However, the specific role of the Chinese city within state-society relations 
has undergone several dramatic shifts since the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) took power in 1949. Mao envisioned cities as centres of production 
rather than consumption, eliminating Central Business Districts (CBDs) 
and reportedly telling planners to limit the size of cities to disperse urban 
populations (Lin 2007). The reform era (post-1978) led to new alterations, 
yet until the 1990s large Chinese cities functioned as political and social 
centres for the state, a far cry from their current role as command and 
control centres for globally-oriented firms and industries (Wu 2016). 
Urban transformations have occurred concomitantly with periods of state 
rescaling and regulatory change. As the reform era began, growth-oriented 
policies prioritised the rapid development of coastal cities and provinces, part 
of what Deng Xiaoping termed the “ladder step” program (Lim and Horesh 
2017). Large Chinese cities would function as both economic engines and 
modern showcases of the country’s progress (Chow 2017). The early market 
reform period saw the devolution of planning controls to local authorities. 
Cities began competing with each other, and a new entrepreneurialism 
gripped Chinese urbanism (Xu and Yeh 2005; Zhang and Wu 2006; Chien 
and Gordon 2008; Wu 2016). Uncoordinated, expansive, and ecologically 
damaging development followed, powering China’s “economic miracle.” The 
built environment of the reform era city reflected these structural changes; 
a land market was established, leading to the commercial redevelopment of 
urban cores as well as large-scale greenfield projects on the fringes (Cartier 
2002). Peripheral development resulted in massive industrial and residential 
relocation, which took the form of spatially scattered, unconnected zones, in 
a model known as “using land to breed land development” (Deng and Huang 
2004; Yeh 2005). 
Yet with China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, a new form of state-
orchestrated spatiality emerged. Driven by a mixture of market and 
state logics, urban reorganisation has led to a fresh wave of suburban 
development. As Shen and Wu (2017) note, in contrast to earlier expansions, 
which exhibited exclusive zoning rights, the new strategy involves the 
creation of multifunctional towns and cities arranged as a “polycentric 
metropolitan region.” Local states have also demonstrated great interest 
in introducing, developing, and deploying market instruments while 
simultaneously engaging in market-like entrepreneurial activities (Wu 2016). 
Suburbanisation has thus become a tool for mobilising capital (Lin and 
Yi 2011), and the state itself has become a player in the housing market 
through its direct involvement in flagship infrastructural and suburban 
projects (Shen and Wu 2017). It is within this context that China’s “new 
towns” or “new cities” have emerged. 
Chinese “new towns” are generally master-planned, mixed-use mega-
development projects that cater to upscale commercial and residential 
usage. Adopting planning notions such as “garden cities,” “smart cities,” 
or “transit-oriented developments” (TODs), the towns are conceptualised 
as growth poles within wider polycentric urban structures (Wu and Zhang 
2007) that simultaneously exhibit deep linkages with the global economy – 
this mirrors the original framing for the Modderfontein development. Indeed, 
many of the projects are designed by international firms with the idea of 
promulgating “world class city” narratives. Additionally, as Wu (2018) notes, 
the projects are used by the local state as collateral to gain capital from 
state banks in order to finance infrastructure and economic development. 
Thus, they form a central part of a transnationally-connected yet regionally-
articulated “growth machine,” in which the state uses market instruments 
to extend its position within the market sphere.  
As with other concepts and instruments that helped China become an 
economic power (e.g., Special Economic Zones), new towns and cities have 
been co-opted by Global South elites as viable tools for politico-economic 
development, regeneration, and the creation of a new urban imaginary (Larkin 
2013). This process has been aided by the expansion of international design 
and planning expertise (see Rapoport 2014; Faulconbridge and Grubber 
2015). For African elites and planners seeking to overcome the continent’s 
legacy of urban underdevelopment, these urban forms represent an attempt 
to start anew, erasing the socio-historical conditions that have produced 
cities in Africa (Carmody and Owusu 2016). 
The Chinese government, its policy banks, and Chinese firms (both state-
owned [SOE] and privately-owned [POE]), have sought to capitalise on 
this trend by taking on roles financing or building Africa’s new towns and 
cities. The Kilamba New City is a particularly pertinent case for “Chinese 
urbanism” in Africa, as it was built and financed by Chinese firms (through 
oil-backed concessional loans) and portrayed throughout the media as 
an example of Sino-Angolan developmental cooperation. In many ways, 
Kilamba has become the pre-eminent example of how Chinese actors are 
changing urban environments on the African continent1 and has inspired 
the construction of similar, if not more grandiose, developments. However, 
the specific configurations of state-corporate actors vary from project 
to project, and results are difficult to reproduce. Indeed, unlike in the 
Modderfontein case, in Kilamba, both central states played a significant role 
in the construction process, and the project elicited broad state support 
(financial, discursive, diplomatic), culminating in a visit by Xi Jinping in 2013. 
Ricardo Reboredo and Frances Brill – Between Global and Local
1.  Chris Weller, “Africa's carbon-copy cities show how much it wants to be the new China,” Business 
Insider, 19 August 2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/african-cities-now-look-like-chinese-
cities-2015-8 (accessed on 26 July 2019).
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The ownership situation is also unique, as the development itself is owned 
by an Angolan SOE while the Angolan central government provided the land 
(forcibly removing the previous occupants) and led marketing operations. 
On the other side, Chinese firms, including large-scale SOE’s such as China 
Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Road and Bridge 
Corporation (CRBC), built the necessary linkages and infrastructure. 
The early Modderfontein story – press releases and 
Chinese visions 
Zendai’s initial concept for the site
In 2012, shortly after purchasing Modderfontein, located in north-
east Johannesburg (map 1) for approximately R1.6 billion (approximately 
USD 110 million) through funds acquired from the Bank of China with 
performance guarantees from South Africa’s Standard Bank (which itself 
is partly owned by a Chinese bank – ICBC), Zendai contracted Chinese 
designers to put together a master plan for the area. Their suggestions, or 
a loose interpretation of them, were then released as computer generated 
images in the South African media. The images used were of rounded glass 
bubbles with large bodies of water between them, a sharp contrast to typical 
Johannesburg low-density gated communities and malls, and indicative of 
Zendai’s modernist agenda. Figure 1 below details the transaction area, while 
Figure 2 is part of the original images released by the MAD Architecture firm2 
for the Modderfontein project (Interview, Researcher, 2017, Johannesburg). 
Special feature
2. MAD would later work with Zendai on the Nanjing Zendai Himalayas Centre, which has a similar 
aesthetic to the early Modderfontein sketches.
Map 1: Modderfontein’s location within Johannesburg. Source: Miles Irving, UCL.
Figure 1. Transaction Area (AECI, 2013).
Figure 2. Artist rendering of the Modderfontein project. Source: Lisa Steyn, “Dai’s vision for a 
Modderfontein metropolis,” Mail & Guardian, 8 November 2013, https://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-
08-00-dais-vision-for-a-new-metropolis (accessed on 8 November 2019).
As has been argued elsewhere, in the case of Modderfontein, interviewees 
at Zendai highlighted how the press reports that accompanied these images 
were “poorly received” (Interview, Zendai, 2015, Johannesburg; Dittgen 2017; 
Brill and Reboredo 2018). As such the company was forced to immediately 
defend their intentions, even before they had started the project. Similarly 
pressing was the scale of the project, which even some within the 
organisation thought had little chance of success in the Johannesburg 
context (Interview, Heartland, 2018, Durban). 
For the residents of Johannesburg, the images and initial reports 
immediately suggested a developer that wanted to make dramatic changes 
to the city’s landscape, which would necessitate broader societal shifts if it 
was to be successful. Given Johannesburg’s history of deliberate exclusion, 
marginalisation, and segregation, large-scale, elite-led developments are 
typically met with scepticism among city planners and the local population. 
As one employee explained: “Yes, there are flats [in Johannesburg] and 
there’s different types of dwellings and you have a look at the Chinese way 
of living – they want to impose that on this area here and then, the Africans, 
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we said ‘hang on, who’s the market now for that’?” (Interview, Zendai, 2017, 
Johannesburg). To some extent, according to those interviewed, a change 
of tack was what Zendai had hoped to achieve with the images (Interview, 
Zendai, 2015 Johannesburg), and Mr. Dai was keen to highlight that 
Modderfontein under his leadership would be significantly different from 
projects attempted before in Johannesburg. 
Following these early evocative images, Zendai began to craft their 
development strategy, which centred on creating an economic hub (Interview, 
Zendai, 2015, Johannesburg) that would be “so much better than Sandton,” 
the financial capital of South Africa (Interview, Zendai, 2017, Johannesburg). 
Following the “new town” plans seen in Chinese urbanism, Zendai sought 
to create a space whose economic activities would be deeply entrenched in 
global economic systems – a new, internationally-oriented economic node. 
Additionally, the original layout presented the project as being connected 
to the broader city through integrated transport systems, including a new 
Gautrain3 station, thus allowing for sustainable growth and the expansion 
of Johannesburg’s polycentric urban core. Initially it was suggested that the 
project would bring in R1 billion in Foreign Direct Investisment (USD 14 
million) and R14 billion (USD 970 million) in direct and indirect benefits to 
the national economy (AECI n.d.), and these figures were used to persuade 
the provincial government to support the project discursively. 
As the South African media highlighted, Zendai sought to induce demand 
(and market the property) through the inter-referencing of global cities (for a 
more comprehensive analysis of Zendai’s actions at this time, see Ballard and 
Harrison 2019). They went so far as to market themselves as the “New York 
of Africa” (Interview, Zendai, 2017, Johannesburg). This statement set the 
tone for the project and was seized upon by local media, which highlighted 
how “the aim is to create a commercial hub to challenge world’s biggest 
cities like Hong Kong, London and New York” (Lomu 2013). Eager to embrace 
spectacle and drum up publicity for the project, Dai similarly stated that 
Modderfontein was to be the “future capital for the whole of Africa” (Times 
Live, 2015, quoted in Carmody and Owusu 2016: 67). To meet these goals, 
Zendai wanted to attract Chinese firms looking to expand to South Africa, 
as well as the continent more broadly. As one Chinese consultant working in 
South Africa explained, the belief among real estate developers in China at 
the time was that the South African market was “very stable, like China 10 
years ago” (Interview, Consultant, 2017, Johannesburg).
Given that many of the people working at Zendai, including their leader, 
Mr. Dai, had extensive commercial experience in China, they considered 
themselves well positioned to create a commercial development that would 
cater to this market. Zendai’s embrace of the China/Africa narrative and their 
deliberate reliance on Chinese/Asian firms epitomises both the hypervisibility 
of Chinese projects and the nebulosity of overall Chinese engagement with 
Africa. In reality, as Pairault (2018) notes, Chinese FDI in Africa represents only 
1.2% of the country’s total outward FDI. In fact, Chinese FDI in the whole of 
Africa is equal to only 14.1% of what it invests in the US, and approximately 
the same as what it invests in Germany. Rather than investing, China mostly 
provides services (typically in the form of construction) and financing 
(through different types of loans) to African countries. However, the media 
typically report agreements under the umbrella of Chinese “investment” 
and can thus distort the reality of Chinese engagement. The distinctions in 
engagement modalities are further blurred by the official discourse, which is 
often kept purposefully vague, and similarly conflates investment/financing/
service provision. In Johannesburg, the “Chinese” (that is, Chinese nationals 
or South Africans of Chinese descent) spatial footprint is characterised 
by largely disconnected spatial clusters (Dittgen 2017). While the “China 
malls” (large-scale shopping centres specialising in wholesaling) near central 
Johannesburg have been paid for through loans from Chinese state banks or 
private financing, no Chinese-backed projects close to Modderfontein’s size 
or cost exist in the city (Interview, Planner, 2017, Johannesburg). In Zendai’s 
case, South Africa’s mature housing market and low growth rates meant that 
without a large influx of Chinese businesses, the original plans for project 
would likely never get off the ground. As such, the early phases of the project 
had a decidedly speculative and outright risky element. Some academics 
have surmised that the entire project may have been a way for Dai to raise 
Zendai’s value before selling the company (Interview, Researcher, 2017, 
Johannesburg), yet if this was the case the rest of the board was kept in the 
dark (Interview, Heartland, 2018, Durban).
The spatiality of the original Modderfontein plan mimicked the patterns 
observed in Chinese urbanism (again specifically the “new towns”), as Zendai 
was going to break from existing incremental development and create a 
new urban district complete with CBD, residential areas, cultural attractions, 
and urban amenities. Whilst smaller versions of these developments are 
arguably also something that characterises Johannesburg’s existing built 
environment (e.g., Waterfall City, Steyn City), given Modderfontein’s original 
goals, networks, and framing, it can be – and was – interpreted as a reflection 
of Zendai’s experiences in China. Additionally, given the direct reliance on 
globally-oriented networks and the embedding of the project within the 
Sino-South African relationship from the outset, Modderfontein immediately 
stood out as unique among large-scale developments. 
Part of creating a new edge city is often marketing around fashionable 
urban terminology; for example, as Watson (2014) has shown, African 
edge city development proposed by international developers often brand 
themselves as eco- or smart. In this way they not only detach themselves 
physically but also rhetorically from the existing urban core and its realities. 
This was also the case in Modderfontein, and it was an element the 
media drew attention to: “The smart city project is a big statement from 
Chinese businesses.”4 Despite this focus on business, the early proposals 
also recognised the need for mixed-used sites, again similar to Chinese 
new towns, as was stated in a media release: “The majority of the land 
will be developed for families, in the hope of developing the area into an 
international community”5 (Dai Zhikang quoted in Slater 2013). These 
proposals also sought to tie the development into existing urban discourses, 
playing up its ties to Johannesburg’s “integrated development” plans (for 
more see Ballard et al . 2017).
A mediated vision: Tempering expectations 
Over the four years following acquistion, Zendai, and their new 
London-based consultants (Atkins), compiled a master plan for the City of 
Johannesburg. Of significant importance to project evolution, however, is the 
ownership change in early 2015. In January of that year, Dai Zhikang sold 
the entirety of his shares to a Chinese state-owned company, China Orient 
Asset Management Corporation (COAMC). COAMC, which was initially a 
“bad bank” for BOC, continues to manage non-performing assets, suggesting 
Ricardo Reboredo and Frances Brill – Between Global and Local
3.  The Gautrain is Johannesburg’s light rail system. It connects Sandton, Pretoria, and OR Tambo 
International Airport. For a more extensive analysis of the proposals of a Modderfontein station 
see Brill and Conte (2019).
4.  Krista Lomu, “Shanghai Zendai to develop a ‘smart city’ in South Africa,” GBTimes, 3 March 2015, 
https://gbtimes.com/shangai-zendai-develop-smart-city-south-africa (accessed on 26 July 2019). 
5. Dylan Slater, “Chinese Developer Determines Modderfontein’s Future,” Bedfordview and Edenvale 
News, 11 November 2013, bedfordviewedenvalenews.co.za/221782/aeci-land-soldaeci-sells-
outland-sold-to-chinese-developersold/ (accessed on 26 July 2019).
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that the Chinese state had little faith in the project’s development (Interview, 
Heartland, 2018, Durban). Approximately a year later, COAMC sold off nearly 
50% of their shares to other Chinese companies (Dittgen 2017), further 
splintering the ownership group. 
Concomitant with the backroom changes, in 2015, Zendai SA and their 
consultants hosted a series of workshops with local stakeholders, including 
the City of Johannesburg. It was during this process that the necessary 
documentation was put together for the planning application. By juxtaposing 
the plan at this stage with the early documents, sketches, and media, it’s 
possible to see how Modderfontein steadily shifted away from the original 
vision and eventually emerged as a more “South African” type of project. 
In terms of the masterplan, the biggest shift was a change in the focus 
of the development’s commercial property: between site visits in 2015 and 
2017, Zendai had reclassified their target market from Chinese businesses 
to knowledge-based firms, largely in response to the changing geopolitics 
of China’s involvement in South Africa. This, arguably, is part of making the 
site more “ordinary” or “normal” within Johannesburg. Within this, Zendai 
wanted to pay particular attention to education (Faku 2014), with the 
potential to build a new university. Additionally, the time frame shifted 
significantly, moving from an original estimate of 15 years of development 
to nearly 50 years (Ballard et al . 2017). As new CEO Du Wenhui noted: 
“Compared with three years ago, the rand has fallen 30 percent. When 
profits cannot make up for the currency loss, we can only slow down our 
investments.”6 Finally, the aesthetic of the project changed significantly. 
The master plan did away with the modernist skyscrapers (and dreams 
of attracting large-scale Chinese capital) and instead focused on cost-
effective offices that would appeal to “users that find value in proximity 
to the airport” (Modderfontein Regeneration 2015). The final plan focused 
on creating an environmentally and socially responsive development that 
would be more in line with Johannesburg’s extant urban fabric and the 
requirements of the municipal government. 
In 2017, the plan went to Planning Council, a reflection of a potential new 
buyer (M&T Development – a South African firm) and the City’s reluctance 
to prolong the process even further (as it had been going for nearly five 
years). The plan that was finally submitted presented a very different vision 
of the site compared to the initial images and ideas circulated under Dai in 
2012. Rather than ultramodern glass skyscrapers – a “New York” of Africa 
– it was instead a more typically Johannesburg-styled project with rows 
of securitised, low-density housing around a central point (in this case, the 
Modderfontein reserve) – it was an ordinary space in Johannesburg’s wider 
urban fabric. While the new Gautrain station is still scheduled to be built, 
whether it will has yet to be determined. Large-scale edge city developments 
have become commonplace in Johannesburg, and in the end Modderfontein 
became another example. Moreover, Fin24 (a South African news website) 
is reporting that the site will largely be dominated by low-income housing 
or “gap housing,” a rapidly developing part of Johannesburg’s real estate 
market. Strong government support for very low-income housing and a large 
supply of high-end housing has meant developers have turned to the “gap” 
– which refers to those buyers who are just beyond the government subsidy 
level. The incremental changes in this project thus typify the way large-scale 
developments slowly unfold and reflect the socio-economic and political 
dynamics of their context. 
Local reactions to Zendai’s evolving plan
As Alden and Wu (2016) note, South Africa’s increasing economic and 
political engagement with China, despite being framed in official government 
policy as necessary for the country’s development needs, has led to an on-
going unease with regards to the nature and depths of these ties. While 
elites, especially within the ANC, are generally friendly with Chinese actors, 
within the popular discourse issues ranging from concern over the opacity 
of deals between the two governments to economic competition between 
South African and Chinese businesses have led to a deep-seated distrust of 
Chinese actors, which occasionally boils over. 
In the case of Modderfontein, this distrust (exacerbated by the 
aforementioned hypervisibility and exaggeration of China’s engagement 
with South Africa) meant that people, including those from the public 
sector, were suspicious of the deal. As one interviewee explained her view: 
the exaggerated images of the site suggested it was one of spectacle and 
rhetoric, rather than encouraging more deliberation over its future. For 
her, “After the death of everything, there will be this amazing thing that 
will happen in Modderfontein” (Interview, City of Johannesburg, 2017, 
Johannesburg). Another explained the root of his fear: that the land was 
“seriously undervalued as land – from a deal-making perspective it was like 
some of the cheapest land ever developed in one of the most well-located 
areas” (Interview, Public official, 2018, Johannesburg). Implicit in this was a 
question of how the deal was negotiated. However, such criticism ignores 
Modderfontein’s historic role as home to one of South Africa’s largest 
dynamite factories. The land eventually set aside for the project was owned 
by AECI, an explosives and specialist chemicals company, and only sold in 
2012. Yet as another media report noted: ‘Without a doubt there has been 
criticism from certain quarters,’ Lai King said, referring to claims that Chinese 
companies flood a country, bring their own workers, take the benefits and 
flee.7 
This dimension was most evident in the way the governance of the site 
was discussed during interviews, where many saw the difference between 
China and South Africa’s urban development being one of the state’s 
role and therefore highlighted how “[i]n China with a very centralised 
government, if you get permission from somewhere at the top it has to 
feed down because there’s a very hierarchical structure” (Interview, City of 
Johannesburg, 2017, Johannesburg). This was understood to be different from 
the situation in South Africa, and as has been reported elsewhere (Brill 2018; 
Ballard and Harrison 2019), “there was a bit of a lack of understanding about 
the local context” (Interview, City of Johannesburg, 2017, Johannesburg). 
Some interviewees were even more explicit, noting that “[t]here was an 
assumption that if you go to Province and get buy-in politically at provincial 
level it will trickle down – that’s how it would work in China” (Interview, 
Engineer, 2017, Johannesburg). 
The view of Zendai, and Dai’s vision for Modderfontein, as something 
inherently Chinese was articulated and arguably to some extent exoticized in 
the media as well. Lisa Steyn’s article highlighted how: “The new billionaire 
in town is a maverick, a visionary, an art collector and businessman.” In 
many ways, this view of Dai as something other than a traditional developer 
speaks to an othering and is evident in descriptions of him, for example: 
“Dai reportedly dreamed of being the Warren Buffet of China.”8 In this way, 
whilst linking Dai to recognisable global (north) individuals associated with 
corporate power, the media continued to differentiate the site and its owner 
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as Chinese, going as far as to note that “according to Mr Dai, the project 
has been titled Zendai Modderfontein and there are also plans to possibly 
change the name of Modderfontein to Zendaifontein” (Bedfordview 2013). 
As such, the project experienced a heightened level of criticism from the 
media that was simply not there for “South African” urban megaprojects 
such as Waterfall City. Given the relative scarcity of large-scale Chinese 
projects in South Africa, the Modderfontein site became emblematic of 
Chinese intervention and quickly became associated with extant narratives 
of neo-colonialism, resource extraction, and government corruption. In 
turn, this fuelled the broader “othering” of the development and Zendai 
as an organisation, and ultimately informed how the development was 
characterised even as it underwent profound changes.  
Conclusion: A “Chinese” megaproject in 
Johannesburg 
The masterplan that eventually went to the planning authority was 
rooted in a global understanding of contemporary urban development, but 
with inflections of South African and Chinese urbanism. Yet with the sale of 
the site, MT Development – the company now in control – is expected to 
build a large-scale project for mixed incomes that will cater to the dominant 
economic activities of Johannesburg and match the city’s extant aesthetic. 
Rather than being a centre for Chinese business, the area will instead likely 
reflect the tendencies of the economy at the time of completion and 
therefore fit within the general decentralisation of commercial activity that 
has come to typify Johannesburg’s development (see Todes 2012). The idea 
of creating a futuristic site for the global economy, rooted to some extent in 
the experiences of a Chinese-based developer, has in the end been mediated 
by the actions of non-Chinese consultants, the City of Johannesburg, and 
local politics.
Ricardo Reboredo and Frances Brill – Between Global and Local
This paper has sought to understand Modderfontein as both a 
manifestation of global trends (e.g., increasing Chinese engagement with 
Africa, urban inter-referencing throughout the Global South) and as reflection 
of place- and context-specific factors. In advancing the agenda and calling 
for more analysis of Africa’s Chinese-inspired urban spaces, we seek to 
demonstrate further that urban development is not monolithic or easy to 
explain, but rather is full of discrepancies and histories upon which any future 
development – and research of said development – must rest. Despite the 
ease with which developers and consulting firms can reference ideas from 
other cities or societies (see Brill and Conte 2019), the specific articulations 
of those urban forms and the particular livelihoods they are intertwined with 
cannot be overlaid into a new context without fundamental alterations. The 
study of new cities and other urban megaprojects on the African continent 
should be recontextualised to focus on the wide range of local features and 
factors that ultimately decide the success or failure of a given project. As 
developments are never strictly top-down affairs, approaching them with 
a lens toward the local makes it possible to move beyond the obvious and 
fully unpack the place-specific flows, forms, and networks that assemble 
within a project. This, we would argue, in line with the broader special issue, 
leads to an almost ordinariness about them.
I Ricardo Reboredo is a PhD candidate at Trinity College, Dublin. 
His research focuses on Sino-African relations, megaprojects, and 
development (reboredor@tcd.ie).  
I Frances Brill is a research fellow at the Bartlett School of Planning. Her 
research focuses on housing delivery, comparative work, and the role of 
real estate developers across London and Johannesburg (frances.brill@
ucl.ac.uk).
Manuscript received on 10 October 2018. Accepted on 22 July 2019.
References
ADAMA, Onyanta. 2017. “Urban Imaginaries: Funding Mega Infrastructure 
Projects in Lagos, Nigeria.” GeoJournal January: 1-18.
AECI. 2013. “Transaction.” https://www.aeciworld.com/pdf/investors/
presentations/2013/heartland-and-zendai-transaction.pdf (accessed on 
26 July 2019).
ALDEN, Chris, and Wu YU-SHAN. 2016. “South African Foreign Policy and 
China: Converging Visions, Competing Interests, Contested Identities.” 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54(2): 203-31.
BALLARD, Richard, Romain DITTGEN, Philip HARRISON, and Alison 
TODES. 2017. “Megaprojects and Urban Visions: Johannesburg’s Corridors 
of Freedom and Modderfontein.” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on 
Southern Africa 95(1): 111-39.
BALLARD, Richard, and Philip HARRISON. 2019. “Transnational 
Urbanism Interrupted: A Chinese Developper’s Attemps to Secure 
Approval to Build the ‘New York of Africa’ at Modderfontein, 
Johannesburg.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space (June). 
DOI:10.1177/0308518X19853277 (accessed on 9 November 2019).
BALLARD, Richard, and Margot RUBIN. 2017. “A Marshall Plan for Human 
Settlements: How Megaprojects Became South Africa’s Housing Policy.” 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 95(1): 1-31.
BRILL, Frances. 2018. “Playing the Game: A Comparison of International 
Actors in Real Estate Development in Modderfontein, Johannesburg 
and London’s Royal Docks.” Geoforum. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.geoforum.2018.05.015 (accessed on 26 July 2019).
CARMODY, Pádraig, and Francis Y. OWUSU. 2016. “Neoliberalism, 
Urbanization and Change in Africa: The Political Economy of 
Heterotopias.” Journal of African Development (18): 61-73.
CARTIER, Carolyn. 2002. “Transnational Urbanism in the Reform-Era 
Chinese City: Landscapes from Shenzhen.” Urban Studies 39(9): 1513-32.
CASTELLS, Manuel. 2010. “Globalisation, Networking, Urbanisation: 
Reflections on the Spatial Dynamics of the Information Age.” Urban 
Studies 47(13): 2737-45.
CHIEN, Shiuh-Shen, and Ian GORDON. 2008. “Territorial Competition in 
China and the West.” Regional Studies 42(1): 31-49.
16 china p e r s p e c t i v e s  •  N o .  2 0 1 9 / 4
Special feature
CHOW, Renee Y. 2017. “Continuity and Change: Challenging the 
Disposable Chinese City.” Architectural Design 87(5): 114-21.
DENG, F. Frederic, and Youqin HUANG. 2004. “Uneven Land Reform and 
Urban Sprawl in China: The Case of Beijing.” Progress in Planning 61(3): 
211-36.
DITTGEN, Romain. 2017. “Features of Modernity, Development and 
‘Orientalism’: Reading Johannesburg through Its ‘Chinese’ Urban Spaces.” 
Journal of Southern African Studies 43(5): 979-96.
FAKU, Dineo. 2014. “Modderfontein city to start next year.” IOL News. 
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/modderfontein-city-to-
start-next-year-1673908 (accessed on 26 July 2019).
FAULCONBRIDGE, James, and Monika GRUBBAUER. 2015. “Transnational 
Building Practices: Knowledge Mobility and the Inescapable Market.” 
Global Networks 15(3): 275-87.
HARRISON, Philip, and Alison TODES. 2017. “Satellite Settlement on the 
Spatial Periphery: Lessons from International and Gauteng Experience.” 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 95(1): 32-62.
HORESH, Niv, and Kean Fan LIM. 2017. “China: An East Asian Alternative 
to Neoliberalism?” The Pacific Review 30(4): 425-42.
LARKIN, Brian. 2013. “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure.” Annual 
Review of Anthropology 42: 327-43.
LIN, George C.S. 2007. “Chinese Urbanism in Question: State, Society, and 
the Reproduction of Urban Spaces.” Urban Geography 28(1): 7-29.
LIN, George C.S., and Fangxin YI. 2011. “Urbanization of Capital or 
Capitalization on Urban Land? Land Development and Local Public 
Finance in Urbanizing China.” Urban Geography 32(1): 50-79.
MODDERFONTEIN REGENERATION. 2015. “Final Workshop Report – 
July 28th and 29th.” Zendai, ARUP, Colliers, Atkins. 
MURPHY, James T., Padraig CARMODY, Richard GRANT, and Francis 
OWUSU. 2018. “The impact of China on African cities: Potentials for 
development.” In Kris Bezdecny and Kevin Archer (eds.), Handbook of 
Emerging 21st-Century Cities. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Publishing.
MURRAY, Martin J. 2015. “Waterfall City (Johannesburg): Privatized 
Urbanism in Extremis.” Environment and Planning A 47(3): 503-20.
NOORLOOS, Femke H. J. van, and Maggi W.H. LEUNG. 2018. “Circulating 
Asian Urbanisms: An Analysis of Policy and Media Discourse in Africa 
and Latin America.” In Eckart Woertz (ed.), Circulating Asian Urbanisms: 
An Analysis of Policy and Media Discourse in Africa and Latin America. 
London and New York: Routledge. 125-42.
NOORLOOS, Femke H. J. van, and Marjan KLOOSTERBOER. 2018. 
“Africa’s New Cities: The Contested Future of Urbanisation.” Urban Forum 
55(6): 1223-41. 
ONG, Aihwa. 2011. “Introduction: Worlding Cities, or the Art of Being 
Global.” In Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (eds.), Worlding cities asian 
experiments and the art of being global. Oxford: Blackwell. 1-26.
PAIRAULT, Thierry. 2018. “Guest Post - China in Africa: Much Ado about 
Investment - Part 2.” China Africa Research Initiative. http://www.
chinaafricarealstory.com/2018/02/guest-post-china-in-africa-much-ado.
html (accessed on 26 July 2019).
RAPOPORT, Elizabeth. 2014. “Utopian Visions and Real Estate Dreams: 
The Eco-City Past, Present and Future.” Geography Compass 8(2): 137-
49.
REN, Xuefei, and Liza WEINSTEIN. 2013. “Urban Governance, Mega-
Projects, and Scalar Transformations in China and India.” In Tony Roshan 
Samara, Shenjing He, and Guo Chen (eds.), Locating Right to the City in 
the Global South. New York: Routledge. 107-26.
ROY, Ananya. 2016. “Who’s Afraid of Postcolonial Theory?” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 40(1): 200-9.
SHEN, Jie, and Fulong WU. 2017. “The Suburb as a Space of Capital 
Accumulation: The Development of New Towns in Shanghai, China.” 
Antipode 49(3): 761-80.
SWYNGEDOUW, Erik, Frank MOULAERT, and Arantxa RODRIGUEZ. 2002. 
“Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large–Scale Urban Development 
Projects and the New Urban Policy.” Antipode 34(3): 542-77.
TAYLOR, Ian. 2016. “Dependency Redux: Why Africa Is Not Rising.” 
Review of African Political Economy 43(147): 8-25.
TODES, Alison. 2012. “Urban Growth and Strategic Spatial Planning in 
Johannesburg, South Africa.” Cities 29(3): 158-65.
TODES, Alison, Dylan WEAKLEY, and Phillip HARRISON. 2017. “Densifying 
Johannesburg: Context, Policy and Diversity.” Journal of Housing and the 
Built Environment 33(2): 281-99.
WATSON, Vanessa. 2014. “African Urban Fantasies: Dreams or 
Nightmares?” Environment and Urbanization 26(1): 215-31. 
WU, Fulong. 2016. “China’s Emergent City-Region Governance: A New 
Form of State Spatial Selectivity through State-Orchestrated Rescaling.” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 40(6): 1134-51.
WU, Fulong. 2018. “Planning Centrality, Market Instruments: Governing 
Chinese Urban Transformation under State Entrepreneurialism.” Urban 
Studies 55(7): 1383-99.
WU, Fulong, and Jingxing ZHANG. 2007. “Planning the Competitive City-
Region: The Emergence of Strategic Development Plan in China.” Urban 
Affairs Review 42(5): 714-40.
XU, Jiang, and Anthony Gar-On YEH. 2005. “City Repositioning and 
Competitiveness Building in Regional Development: New Development 
Strategies in Guangzhou, China.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 29(2): 283-308.
YEH, Anthony Gar-On. 2005. “Dual Land Market and Internal Spatial 
Structure of Chinese Cities.” In Fulong Wu and Laurence J. C. Ma (eds.), 
Restructuring the Chinese City: Changing Society, Economy and Space. 
London: Routledge. 59-79.
